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BOOK REVIEW
THE HERMENEUTIC TOURIST: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
Daniel A. Farberf
INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATWVE STUDY. Edited by D. Neil Mac-
Cormick and Robert S. Summers. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co.,
Ltd. 1991. Pp. xiv, 567.
As with tourism, one of the pleasures of comparative law is the
collection of amusing trivia. Consider, for example, the plight of
judges in the lower French courts. Their opinions are rarely pub-
lished, and even then, only at the sufferance of the editors of the law
journals.' (Imagine if federal court of appeals judges had to submit
their work to the third-year students who edit ourjournals.) But then,
French judicial opinions themselves are rather different from those
elsewhere. We are told of a comparative study of three judicial opin-
ions on the same subject from courts in France, Germany, and the
United States. The French decision had three hundred words, the
German two thousand, and the American majority opinion alone had
eight thousand.2 It is little wonder, however, that French opinions are
so brief, for the highest civil court in France decides twenty thousand
appeals annually.3
t HenryJ. Fletcher Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research, and Acting Associ-
ate Vice President for Academic Affairs, University of Minnesota. I would like to thank Phil
Frickey and Fred Morrison for their helpful comments.
1 INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 198 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert
S. Summers eds., 1991) [hereinafter MACCoRMICK & SUMMERS]. THE SAME IS TRUE FOR GER-
MANJUDGES. Id. at 105. This reflects the salutary principle of the civil law that law profes-
sors are more important than judges. See JOHN HENRY MEmRRYMAN, THE CmVL LAw
TRADrrION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA 80-84 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter MERRYMAN] (noting that the traditional civil law
model "glorifies the scholar" and "demeans thejudge"). Under the civil law, as Merryman
puts it, the judge is a "kind of expert clerk." Id. at 36. "Judicial service is a bureaucratic
career, the judge is a functionary, a civil servant; the judicial function is narrow, mechani-
cal and uncreative." Id. at 38. In contrast, the "legal scholar is the great man of the civil
law." Id. at 60.
2 MACCORMIcK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 172.
3 Id. at 209. This is an impressive number, even taking into account the fact that this
court has two hundred judges. Id. at 489.
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Besides brevity, the French judge has other constraints to worry
about. In France, ajudge who refuses to decide a case because the law
is silent or obscure is subject to criminal prosecution.4 Stringent con-
straints on opinion writing are not unknown elsewhere. In Italy, a
statute forbids judges to cite law professors.5 In Scotland, however, it
is apparently permissible to cite the work of academics, but only if
they are dead-though it is apparently considered good form to
plagiarize the work of living scholars.6 And so on, with each country
from Finland to Argentina having some charming quirk of its own.
Another pleasure of travel is the discovery of unexpected familiar-
ities-things that one had thought were distinctively American but
turn out to be international. Such, for example, is the "absurdity"
rule, which traces its roots in American law to the famous Holy Trinity
case. 7 This rule allows a court to avoid the literal meaning of a statute
in order to avoid a bizarre result. It turns out that this rule is a staple
of statutory interpretation everywhere.8 The leading French case is
particularly droll, involving a statute that, if read literally, would have
prohibited passengers from getting on or off of a train except when it
was moving.9 Thus, in France as in America, the court must inquire
further into the intention of the legislature when a literal meaning
would produce a nonsensical result.1
Like the serious traveler, however, the comparativist has more in
mind than merely collecting anecdotes about the peculiar ways of for-
eigners, or even about their surprising similarities to the folks at
home. The comparative study of law may reveal patterns that tran-
scend any individual legal system. It may also highlight the peculiari-
ties of particular legal systems, reveal intriguing alternatives to familiar
legal rules, or present novel approaches to jurisprudential issues. Mo-
tivated by these more serious concerns, an international group of
4 Id. at 174.
5 Id. at 229.
6 Id. at 879.
7 Rector, Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). The issue in
Holy Trinity was whether a nineteenth-century immigration law, meant to prevent employ-
ers from paying manual workers to enter the country, should be applied to an Episcopal
church that had hired a minister from England.
8 MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 485. The authors note that while the
rule is almost universal, its form differs between countries:
[The absurdity] argument is recognized in virtually every system in our
study, though not always in the same form. It is sometimes formulated in
the UK in terms of a presumption to the effect that the legislature does not
intend absurd or manifestly unjust outcomes. In Germany and in Italy such
an argument is typically constitutionalized, and thus formulated as an argu-
ment that invalidates the absurd or manifestly unjust result.
Id.
9 Id. at 192.
10 Id. at 196.
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scholars led by Robert Summers worked for nearly a decade on a com-
parative study of statutory interpretation in nine countries." The re-
sult is a five hundred-page study that provides a wealth of information
about the legal systems and interpretative methods of those countries.
Like most of American legal scholarship, the rapidly growing
literature on statutory interpretation has been quite parochial. This
book provides an important and long overdue international perspec-
tive on the fervent American debate about methods of statutory inter-
pretation. Part I of this review will provide an overview of the
MacCormick and Summers book. Besides examining the general
findings of Interpreting Statutes, Part I explores the book's treatment of
some particularly interesting interpretive methods used by German
courts. Part II focuses on the recent revival of formalism by American
judges such as Antonin Scalia and Frank Easterbrook. International
experience with similar ideas, as recounted in this book and else-
where, is quite revealing about the potential pitfalls of this approach.
In particular, the strenuous efforts of French law to implement a thor-
ough-going formalism have turned out to be remarkably unsuccessful
in limiting the creative, policy-making activities ofjudges.
I
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AROUND =H WORLD
A. General Findings
Interpreting Statutes begins with a brief discussion of the goals and
methods used by the authors. While much comparative work consists
of explication and comparison of the substantive rules of various legal
systems, 12 the authors opted for a different approach. Rather than
laying out whatever rules of interpretation are used in the nine coun-
tries studied, they investigated the forms of argument deployed in stat-
utory cases in those countries. They catalogued the interpretative
claims that are considered legitimate in various legal systems, those
that are not only legitimate but mandatory, and those that are consid-
ered illegitimate. In addition, the authors made some effort to con-
sider the ways in which various types ofjustifications can counter one
another, whether by means of some trumping order or a balancing
11 This group began life as the Comparative Statutory Interpretation Group and was
later called the Bielefelder Kreis. It met for the first time in 1983 and concluded its work
in 1990. In addition to the editors, contributors include Aulis Aarnio (Finland), Robert
Alexy (Germany), Zenon Bankowski (Britain), Gunnar Bergholz (Sweden), Ralf Dreier
(Germany), Christophe Grzegorczyk (France), Massimo La Torre (Italy), Enrico Pattaro
(Italy), Aleksander Peczenik (Sweden), Michele Taruffo (Italy), Michel Troper (France),
Jerzy Wr6blewski (Poland), and Enrique Zuleta-Puceiro (Argentina). Id. at xi-xii.
12 This approach seems less likely to be fruitful in exploring differences in judicial
methodology than in exploring different substantive regimes on matters such as torts or
contracts or criminal procedure.
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test.13 In order to provide a common basis for comparison, they
agreed on a detailed questionnaire to be used by each author as the
framework for analyzing individual countries.' 4
The goal of the study, in short, is an understanding of the struc-
ture ofjustificatory arguments used in interpreting statutes. Linguists
have used this kind of structural investigation with great success.' 5 Lit-
erary critics and anthropologists such as Uvi-Strauss have also used
this method fruitfully.' 6 The effort to apply structural methods to
comparative law is certainly worthwhile.
The overall results of the study are illuminating. One such result
is that a common core of eleven arguments is used in all of the legal
systems under study. For example, every legal system recognizes the
importance of ordinary meaning, the significance of precedent, the
relevance of evolving understandings of statutory purposes, and the
need to put a particular provision into its statutory context. 17 At one
level, the universality of these arguments may seem trite: what
method of statutory interpretation would view the ordinary meaning
of words as completely irrelevant?' 8
The existence of this common core of arguments seems signifi-
cant, however, for two reasons. First, it is an indication that all of
these legal systems are engaged in a common venture-that there re-
ally is some similar activity called statutory interpretation that is taking
place in all of these systems. It is certainly imaginable that a legal
system would have legislative rules and courts, but that the way courts
use those rules would differ in some radical way from what we call
13 MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 26-27.
14 The questionnaire is found in the Appendix. Id. at 545-51. For example, question
six asks about "general and systematic ways" in which conflicts between different types of
arguments are resolved:
What patterns, if any, are there here? In choosing between conflicting ar-
guments, do the highest courts commonly give primary emphasis to what
they assume to be the literal or ordinay meaning of words in the statute? Or
to 'contextual meaning' (if this is different)? Or to fulfilling the intention of
the legislator? (If so, in what sense?) Or to fulfilling the reasonable sense of
the statute in light of its purpose?
Question six then goes on to inquire about priority and weighing rules used by courts. Id.
at 546.
15 See generaly STEVEN PINKER, THE IANGUAGE INSTINCT: How THE MIND CREATES LAN'-
GUAGE (1994).
16 See, e.g., CLAUDE LLv STRAUSS, STRuruTRAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Claire Jacobson &
Brooke G. Schoepf trans., 1963). For background on structuralism, see TERRY EAGLETON,
LrrERARY THEORY- AN INTRODUCTION 94-100 (1983).
17 MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 512-25.
18 See Edward Rubin, Book Review, 41 Am.J. COMp. L. 128, 139 (1993) (reviewing D.
MacCormick & R. Summers, Interpreting Statutes) (noting that this list of similarities is only
what one would "naturally expect").
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statutory interpretation. 19 At least in the Western legal systems dis-
cussed in this book, however, this does not seem to be the case.
Second, at least some of the eleven arguments are less obviously
legitimate than the argument from ordinary meaning. For example,
the authors call the eighth form of argument "historical." It derives its
force "from the fact that, as a matter of historical evolution, the statute
has come to stand for something rather different from what its lan-
guage facially indicates or its original design indicates."20 It is cer-
tainly possible to imagine a legal system that was steadfastly originalist
and simply refused to recognize such statutory evolution as legitimate.
Indeed, as we will see in Part II, staunch advocates for such an ap-
proach can be found in the United States today. It is noteworthy that
no Western-type legal system has embraced this pure form of original-
ism in practice.
Besides cataloguing these "universal" interpretative arguments,
the authors also devote some attention to the relationships between
these arguments. What happens when different types of arguments
conflict? If there were a Restatement of International Statutory Inter-
pretation, the main rule would be that the ordinary meaning of the
statutory language (or in appropriate cases, the technical meaning of
the word) prevails except under special circumstances. 2' This would,
of course, have to be followed by pages of discussion of what consti-
tutes "special circumstances." "In all the systems studied here, the lin-
guistic aspect of interpretative justification has greatest prominence in
the sense of nearly always coming first in order of consideration. Lin-
guistic arguments are everywhere regarded as having extremely strong
primafacie force in justification."22 Again, this is not a startling result,
but it confirms the commonality of the task of interpretation in differ-
ent legal systems.
Although the authors do not express it in quite the same terms,
this commonality of interpretative rules could also be taken as support
for Lon Fuller's idea of an inner morality of law. Fuller's view was that
the very idea of a legal system implied certain ethical commitments,
which are "thin" in the sense of allowing very wide variation in terms
of substantive values, but still require judges to adhere to certain
moral values.23 Although they do not link their discussion with
Fuller's, the authors are not shy in telling us that the forms of inter-
pretative argument have ethical roots:
19 It would not be utterly astonishing if this were true in countries on the periphery of
Western Europe, such as Finland and Poland, which might be expected to diverge in some
respects from standard European legal culture.
20 MAcCoRMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 469.
21 Id. at 481.
22 Id. at 53.
23 See LoN L. FULLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
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Statutory interpretation is often treated by lawyers, and all the
more by philosophers of law, as a forbiddingly dry and purely for-
mal subject. The error in this view is now plain. Interpretation is
through and through a matter implicating fundamental values of
the law. It can be well done only by those who study to achieve a
reflective and balanced overall conception of the full set of intersub-
jectively acknowledged values of the law.24
It follows, then, that if a solid core of shared rules of interpretation
exists, a common core of interpretative values must also exist.
As interesting as the commonalties of different legal systems are,
their differences are equally interesting. One of the key disagree-
ments between legal systems regards the possibility of overcoming
clear language with legislative history. Jurisdictions seem to be evenly
split about whether the "plain" meaning can be overridden by espe-
cially strong evidence of actual legislative intent.25 Surprisingly
enough, the fault line does not correspond with the division between
the common-law and civil-law traditions. 26 Another noteworthy divi-
sion relates to deference to administrative agencies in matters of statu-
tory construction. Courts in France and the United States, which in
other respects are very different in their approaches to statutory inter-
pretation, both show great deference to an agency's interpretation of
its own statute. Britain gives less deference to agencies, and Italy and
a number of other countries give them no deference at all.27
B. Particular Approaches to Interpretation: The Case of
Germany
All of this is of some interest, but the reader might well be for-
given for wondering whether it is really necessary to wade through the
preceding 459 pages of the book before getting to these conclusions.
Read consecutively, the individual country studies may tend to blur
into a confusing mass. However, they contain a great deal of interest-
ing information about individual countries, which is well deserving of
further attention from American scholars. The individual country
studies thus provide a wealth of information about the rich array of
approaches to statutory interpretation. One considerable virtue of
24 MAcCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 538. The authors make it clear in the
preceding paragraph and elsewhere that they are speaking even of relatively noncontrover-
sial methods of interpretation such as ordinary meaning. Id. at 53S-34.
25 Id. at 484.
26 Id. In general, divisions about statutory interpretation do not seem to fall along the
common law/civil law divide. "Thus some largely civil law systems such as Sweden and
Argentina appear to be more similar in matters of interpretation to the so-called common
law systems than to Continental systems." Id. at 508.
27 Id. at 473. One might venture to guess that some of these differences may relate to
disparate perceptions of the general level of performance of civil servants (and of their
political supervisors) in these countries.
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these individual studies is that they provide a taste of different juris-
prudential possibilities-approaches to interpretation that differ in in-
triguing ways from our own.
Perhaps the most interesting of these contrasting approaches is
the German. Contemporary German law, like the law of the United
States, has a strong constitutional order, vigorously enforced through
judicial review. Courts in both countries are explicit about applying
societal values in statutory interpretation, but the two legal systems
have intriguing differences as well as similarities.
Germany is, of course, a civil-law country. Many American read-
ers will understand this to mean that precedent plays no role in Ger-
man law, for the doctrine of stare decisis is often taken to be the
critical distinction between the common law and the civil codes. In
reality, however, precedent is quite important in German law (and in
other civil law countries, for that matter). A German lawyer who fails
to cite governing precedents faces liability for malpractice. 28 There is
nevertheless an important difference between the German and Ameri-
can attitudes toward precedent. Protection of reliance interests is cen-
tral to our idea of stare decisis. But while giving weight to precedent,
the Germans have made a conscious decision to ignore reliance on
prior decisions as a factor in determining whether to overrule prior
law:
As we saw, precedents... do not have the status of a formal
source of law. Precedents do, however, play an outstanding role in
justifying judicial decisions. This is expressed in that whoever
wishes to depart from a precedent carries the burden of argument.
This burden of argument does not prevent a line of decisions from
being changed only because the citizens trusted in its continuance:
"This would result in the courts' being bound to a certain jurisdic-
tion once established, even if it could not really be kept up on ac-
count of new insights or a change in social, political or economic
conditions."29
The openness of German courts toward evolutionary or evolu-
tional interpretation is also found when the statute invokes a social
norm that has changed over time, such as norms about improper sex-
ual behavior. The well-established rule is that the court should apply
the contemporary norm, rather than the one in existence at the time
the statute was passed.30
A critical question is when to depart from the ordinary meaning
of the statute. The general idea seems to be that the judge is bound
by the law generally rather than by a particular statute, so that the
28 Id. at go.
29 Id. at 97 (cross-references and citations'omitted).
30 Id. at 84.
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general imperatives of the legal system may come into play when inter-
preting a particular statute:
The judge does not, however, have to stop at the wording of a
norm. His being bound by the law does not mean being bound to
its letter with the coercion to interpret literally, but being bound to
[the] sense and purpose of the law. The interpretation is the
method and way by which the judge inquires into the content of a
statute, considering its placement within the whole legal order,
without being restricted by the formal wording.3'
It is this holistic method of legal interpretation that seems most dis-
tinctively German and most intriguingly different from our own. Par-
ticularly interesting is the way that constitutional values enter into
statutory interpretation under the German holistic system.
The German Federal Constitutional Court's so called Soraya deci-
sion illustrates the holistic approach.32 The case involved the publica-
tion of what purported to be an interview with Princess Soraya;
actually, the interview was entirely fictional.33 She recovered damages
despite a statute that appeared to exclude damages for non-material
injuries (with certain inapplicable exceptions), a 4 The court consid-
ered privacy to be a value immanent in the constitution,3 5 and applied
this value to justify an exception from the literal meaning of the Code
provision.3 6 The court's general thoughts about the jurisprudential
aspects of the case are particularly interesting:
The law is not identical with the whole of the written statutes. Over
and above the positive enactments of the state power there can be
'ein Mehr an Recht' (a surplus of law) which has its source in the
constitutional legal order as a holistic unity of meaning, and which
can operate as a corrective to the written law; to find it and to de-
liver it in decisions is the task of adjudication.... The task of adjudi-
cation can demand especially that evaluative assumptions which are
immanent in the constitutional legal order, but are not, or are only
incompletely, expressed in the texts of the written statues, be eluci-
dated and realized in decisions by an act of evaluative cognition
which, admittedly, does not lack volitional elements. In this, the
judge must avoid arbitrariness; his decision must be based on ra-
tional argumentation. It must be understood that the written stat-
ute fails to fulfil its function of providing a just solution for a legal
31 Id. at 94 (quoting the German Federal Constitutional Court; citations omitted); see
also id. at 96 on the need for the exercise ofjudgment in determining the limits ofjudicial
creativity in interpretation.
32 Id. at 80 (citingjudgment of February 2, 1973, 34 BVerfG, 269, 287 (F.R.G.) [here-
inafter Soraya].
33 Id. at 80.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 98
36 The Code section at issue in the Soraya case was s.253 BGB (Civil Code). Id. at 80.
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problem. The judicial decision then fills this gap according to the
standards of practical reason and the 'community's well-founded
general ideas ofjustice.'37
Thejudiciary's understanding of the "general idea ofjustice" is in
turn shaped by the constitution, as the constitutional court has ex-
plained. According to the court, rather than being value neutral, the
German constitution establishes "an objective order of values" which
is centered on "the human personality freely unfolding itself within
the social community, and in human dignity."3S All provisions of the
civil law must be interpreted in the spirit of these norms.
This strong desire for coherence is exemplified by a decision re-
lating to government searches, which construed the word "dwelling"
to include a professional office. That interpretation, the court said,
fits sensibly with the principles the Federal Constitutional Court has
developed for the interpretation of the basic right of the freedom of
profession. If in that case professional work is seen as an essential
element of the development of personality, and if it is therefore
granted, within the frame of the single human being's individual
conduct of life, an especially high rank, it is coherent to guarantee a
correspondingly efficient protection of the spatial range in which
the work is primarily conducted.3 9
To American eyes, this might seem to be a rather free-wheeling
method of interpretation. Yet it apparently thrives in a highly struc-
tured and professionalized legal system, and in a society which has, at
times, viewed "following orders" as the highest social norm.40 Of
course, the materials presented here do not even begin to make a case
for imitating this approach. Perhaps a fuller appreciation of German
law would seriously modify this account of the holistic technique, or
perhaps the holistic technique works poorly even in Germany, or per-
haps it works only because of distinctive features of German society or
legal culture. On the other hand, perhaps there is something here of
use to Americans. In any event, the materials on German law, like the
other studies of individual legal systems in Interpreting Statutes, cannot
37 Id. at 80 (quoting Soraya, at 287). This decision is apparently considered controver-
sial, and should not be taken as an indication that German courts freely rewrite statutes. In
particular, a much more restrained approach is taken with respect to criminal statutes. Id.
at 80-81.
38 Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
39 Id. at 88 (citations omitted).
40 For a discussion of the aspirations of German-influenced civil law to rigorous sys-
temization, see MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 61-62. On the general creativity of the German
judiciary, see B.S. Markesinis, Conceptualism, Pragmatism and Courage: A Common Lawyer
Looks at Somejudgments of the German Federal Court, 34AM.J. COMP. L. 349 (1986) (emphasiz-
ing tort law and privacy law); John Dawson, The General Clauses, Viewed from a Distance, 29
RABELs ZETScHRIT 441 (1987), reprinted in MARYANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADrONs 251 (2d ed. 1994).
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help but expand the imaginative space open to us when we contem-
plate our own legal system.
II
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEW FORMAuSM
Comparative research may be helpful in more immediate ways to
American legal scholars. Presently, a spirited attack is being made on
conventional approaches to statutory interpretation by advocates of
formalism. These advocates, led by Antonin Scalia and Frank Easter-
brook, have called for a purely textualist approach, which would focus
on plain meaning rather than legislative intent. Examining the expe-
rience of courts in other countries can provide a fresh perspective on
the debate over their proposals. After briefly sketching the views of
the new formalists and their critics, this Part will consider the insights
available from the materials that MacCormick and Summers have
assembled.
A. An Introduction to the New Formalism
The conventional approach to statutory interpretation has in-
volved an eclectic mix of reliance on text, statutory purpose, public
policy, and legislative history.41 In the 1980s, formalists mounted a
challenge to this conventional approach in favor of a much more con-
strained method of statutory interpretation.42 As William Eskridge ex-
plains, "[f] ormalism posits thatjudicial interpreters can and should be
tightly constrained by the objectively determinable meaning of a stat-
ute; if unelectedjudges exercise much discretion in these cases, dem-
ocratic governance is threatened."43 Formalists stress that the proper
forum for policy making in a legislative society is the legislature. The
role ofjudges is to apply statutes as they are written, without regard to
concepts such as statutory purpose or legislative intent, and without
attempting to adapt statutes to changing times. "Laws are designed to
bind, to perpetuate a solution devised by the enacting legislature, and
do not change unless the legislature affirmatively enacts something
new... Law does not change in meaning as the political culture
changes."44 There are several corollaries to this formalist thesis.
First, according to formalists, legislative history should not be
consulted. To begin with, the legislative history is irrelevant because
"the law" consists of the statutes Congress passed, not the ideas in the
41 For a fuller discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Intepretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990).
42 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994).
43 William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 646 (1990).
44 Easterbrook, supra note 42, at 69.
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minds of the legislators. 45 Moreover, consulting legislative history
weakens the separation of powers because the President can veto only
the language of the bill, not the unwritten intentions of its support-
ers.46 Furthermore, allowing the use of legislative history simply em-
powers judges to enact their own policy choices at the expense of the
statutory language47 and licenses individual legislators and their staffs
to make law without obtaining the full support of their colleagues. 48
Second, formalists maintain that the ideas of legislative purpose
and legislative intent are incoherent. A legislature is a collective body
whose members are often in disagreement and have no coherent set
of preferences. Legislation is often a compromise between opposing
interests, whose only purpose is to strike a deal. "Legislation is com-
promise. Compromises have no spirit; they just are."49 Hence, when
the legislature has failed to speak clearly to an issue, it is pointless for
a court to try to fill the gap. When a court reaches the limits of a
statute's clear instructions, the only solution is to put the statute aside
and admit that it provides no basis for ruling.50 As Judge Easterbrook
puts it:
Hard questions have no right answers. Let us not pretend that texts
answer every question. Instead we must admit that there are gaps in
statutes, as in the law in general. When the text has no answer, a
court should not put one there on the basis of legislative reports or
moral philosophy-or economics! Instead the interpreter should
go to some other source of rules, including administrative agencies,
common law, and private decision.5'
According to formalists, refusing to stretch statutory language or fill
gaps has another major advantage. Knowing that courts will follow
only their plain language, legislators will have an incentive to draft
carefully and precisely.52 Thus, by adopting formalism, courts help
45 Id. at 65-66.
46 See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (noting that legislative history is a poor substitute for bicameralism and
presentment); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutoy Interpreta-
tion Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 404-05 (1992).
47 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that courts should not look to legislative history when the language of a statute is
clear); Kenneth N. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative Histoy, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371,
376 (Allowing courts to use legislative history "introduces the voice of the federal courts-
the nonpolitical branch-into the political process.").
48 Slawson, supra note 46, at 397-98.
49 Easterbrook, supra note 42, at 68.
50 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 944-45 (1983).
51 Easterbrook, supra note 42, at 68.
52 See Note, Wy Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative Histoy Today, 105 HtARv.
L. REv. 1005, 1022 (1992).
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foster the democratic process.53 If Congress dislikes the results, it is
always free to legislate again.
What this adds up to is, as Judge Easterbrook puts it, a "relatively
unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation,"54 offered in the
name of upholding the legislature's monopoly on policy making.
Only this mechanical approach "can be reconciled with the premises
of democratic governance." 55 This approach is also consistent with
the essence of the judicial function, which should be governed by "the
lines of logical and analytical categories," operating under clear rules
rather than fuzzy principles.56 For the judge, then, logic and consis-
tency are the very foundation of law.57
Not surprisingly, the arguments of these formalists have been sub-
ject to a barrage of attacks by defenders of more flexible methods of
statutory interpretation. 58 These critics have attacked virtually every
premise of the formalist theory. Perhaps more significantly, even crit-
ics who sympathize with formalist goals have initiated an attack on the
implementation of the formalist program by judges. One critic has
charged that courts have "begun to use textualist methods of construc-
tion that routinely allow them to attribute 'plain meaning' to statutory
language that most observers would characterize as ambiguous or in-
ternally inconsistent, and even to attribute 'plain meaning' to lan-
guage that 'was nearly universally believed to have a contrary meaning
for many decades."' 59 Others describe the new formalism as increas-
ing the tension between democracy and the rule of law and serving "as
a cover for the injection of conservative values into statutes."60 Room
for doubt exists, then, whether the new formalism is living up to the
promises of its advocates.
Can faithful reliance on statutory language take the courts out of
the business of policymaking? Is reliance on legislative intent incon-
sistent with the proper functioning of a democracy? In short, can for-
malism hold courts and legislatures in their proper spheres within the
53 United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2424 (1988) (Scalia,J., concurring in part).
54 Easterbrook, Text and History, supra note 42, at 67.
55 Id. at 63.
56 SeeAntonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary LegalAnalysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 581, 593 (1989/1990); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHX. L. REv. 1175, 1176 (1989).
57 Scalia, Assorted Canards, supra note 56, at 588, 590.
58 For some recent examples, seeJamesJ. Brudney, Congressional Commentary onjudi-
cial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response, 93 MICH. L REv. 1, 40-66
(1994); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism and the Rule
of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 550-54 (1992); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung,
Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory
Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REv. 803, 825-31 (1994).
59 RichardJ. Pierce, Hypertextualism, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 752 (1995).
60 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. R v. 26, 77 (1994).
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separation of powers? As we will see, a comparative perspective on
these questions may be illuminating.
B. A Comparative Perspective on Formalism
Formalism may be a novelty in the late-twentieth century Ameri-
can context, but it has long been known in Europe. Partly in a re-
sponse to perceived excesses by pre-Revolutionaryjudges, the French
Revolution embraced a highly formalist view of judging:
The first concern of the Revolution was to limit the role of the
courts to a judicial function, understood in the strictest manner.
Members of the constitutional assembly repeatedly referred to Mon-
tesquieu, who had written that judicial power is null and that the
judge is no more than the mouth of the law. In effect, the concep-
tion of the judicial function during the French Revolution was that
it consisted in expressing syllogisms, the major premiss being the
statute, the minor the facts and the conclusion the decision itself.
Since the statute is the expression of the general will and the facts
are objective, the only role for the judge is to draw an automatic
conclusion. 6'
This view of the judiciary rested on a strict vision of the separa-
tion of powers. Some writers argued that judges should be denied
even the power to interpret laws. For "if a judge were allowed to de-
cide what meaning to give to an ambiguous provision or an obscure
statement, he would again be making law."62 Instead, courts should
refer any interpretative issues to the legislature for clarification. 63 Ac-
cordingly, "French judges thus purport to leave law-making entirely to
the legislature, on the ground that the legislature is the democrati-
cally elected organ of the people."64
Even today, this view of the judicial role shapes the image of the
judge in the civil-law tradition. It is not uncommon to find judicial
decisions that consist entirely of a recitation that a certain conclusion
"emerges from the text itself. '65 Because of the syllogistic form of the
opinions, competing considerations are rarely considered. Instead,
the courts authoritatively announce the only logically possible conclu-
sion, even in cases that everyone knows are difficult. 66 In contrast to
common-law countries, judges in the civil law world are cofisidered
glorified bureaucrats, whose function is merely "to find the right legis-
lative provision, couple it with the fact situation, and bless the solution
61 MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 203.
62 MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 29.
63 Id. at 39-40.
64 MAcCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 503.
65 Id. at 182 (citation omitted). Commonly, French courts claim not to engage in
interpretation at all; rather, the answer "springs obviously from" the text. Id. at 190.
66 Id. at 497.
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that is more or less automatically produced from the union."67 Unless
the judge is poorly trained and "doesn't know how to follow clear in-
structions," or the statute is misdrafted, there should be no hard
cases.
68
In reality, of course, things have been far different The idea that
properly drafted legislation contains no gaps or uncertainties has
been among the first to go. Following French ideas to their logical
conclusion, Frederick the Great promulgated a civil code with 16,000
articles. Judges were forbidden to interpret the code; any doubtful
cases were to be referred to a special statutory commission. The
whole project was a dismal failure.69 Despite legislative efforts to pro-
vide clear solutions to all possible problems, legislative practice in
Code countries "falls far short of this objective," 70 and as a result,
judges continually find themselves confronted with situations in which
they must make new law.
As it happened, the French Code was adopted just before the in-
dustrial revolution came to France. Courts immediately found them-
selves confronting a host of problems that had not been anticipated
by the drafters. In response, the courts invented much of the modem
French law of torts.71 They were also forced to invent the law of insur-
ance despite a statute that, if read literally, would have made the insur-
ance business illegal.72 Sometimes acting contrary to the language of
statutes, these allegedly formalist French judges have essentially
amended statutes to deal with changed circumstances. 73 According to
one recent commentator,
[V]irtually all of French tort law is based on judicial decisions and
academic writing. Courts also have made significant contributions
to the development of private law on unjust enrichment, specific
performance of contractual obligations, and many other aspects of
the law of contracts. Indeed, "it would be hard to find a single arti-
cle of the Civil Code to which there have not been added depths of
meaning and major restrictions and extensions that could not have
been forseen in 1804.' '74
67 MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 36.
68 Id. at 81.
69 Id. at 39.
70 Id. at 83.
71 Id. According to Merryman, the French "code provisions are so rudimentary and
so empty of substance that judges have had to create the applicable law on a case-by-case
basis." Id. at 153.
72 MAcCoRMIcK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 173.
73 Id.
74 Michael Wells, French and AmericanJudicial Opinions, 19 YALEJ. INT'L L. 81, 99-100
(1994) (quotingJOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 401 (1968)). Because of its
origins within the executive branch, the Conseil d'Etat may have felt fewer scruples than an
ordinary French court about making new law. By thinking of themselves as administrators
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Relations between the citizen and the state, governed in the
United States mainly by constitutional and statutory law, are gov-
erned in France primarily by subconstitutional administrative law.
Most of this law is made by the Conseil d'Etat, a court that evolved
out of the bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century. This body
of law began as and has largely remained a product of judicial in-
vention, no more based on statute than is English or American com-
mon law.75
Compensation for governmental takings provides a striking ex-
ample of this phenomenon. In a well-known case, the French legisla-
ture had banned the manufacture of certain dairy products.
"Interpreting" this statute, the court held that the manufacturer was
entitled to compensation from the government. The basis for this in-
terpretation was that the statute was silent on the issue:
"Nothing, either in the very text of the statute or in the [legislative
history] or in the general circumstances of the case, can support the
idea that the lawgiver has intended to place on the plaintiff a bur-
den which normally is not incumbent on him; this burden, estab-
lished for the general interest, ought to be borne by the
community."76
Thus, the court meekly deferred to this silent legislative mandate,
thereby creating out of whole cloth a right American law locates in the
text of the Constitution.
If the French experience is any guide, formalism may be an admi-
rable ambition, but its vision of the judicial role is at best quixotic.77
Despite centuries of indoctrination in formalist ideology, the French
courts seem to have been unable to live up to formalist aspirations,
and judicial candor has been sacrificed. One price of the formalist
ideology is a certain judicial hypocrisy. Everyone knows that French
judges rely on policy considerations, but these considerations never
make any appearance in published opinions, which instead rely on
uninformative syllogisms.78
If nothing else, this comparative exercise suggests the need for a
certain degree of skepticism about the claims of formalists. Compara-
tive studies also raise questions about the formalist attack on the use
of legislative history in statutory interpretation. As Interpreting Statutes
rather than simplyjudges, the members of the Conseil d'Etat may have reduced the cogni-
tive dissonance caused by their activism.
75 Id.
76 MAcCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 192; see also id. at 205-06 (providing fur-
ther discussion of the holding).
77 As Merryman puts it, the French experience "confirms the folly and futility of at-
tempting to restrict judges to a non-creative role" in the interests of "judicial restraint."
John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1865, 1873-78 (1988).
78 Wells, supra note 74, at 116-17.
19961
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
reports, reference to legislative history is practically universal in statu-
tory interpretation among the legal systems surveyed. 79
At the time of the comparative study conducted for Interpreting
Statutes, only Britain was an exception to this rule, and even this devia-
tion was illuminating. First, despite the purported rule prohibiting
the use of legislative history, reference to legislative history was not in
fact unknown. As one noted jurist said:
I always look at Hansard [the official debates], I always look at the
Blue Books [committee reports], I always look at everything I can in
order to see what is meant... The idea that [the Law Lords] do not
read these is quite rubbish.80
In addition, there were exceptions to rules allowing the use of certain
kinds of legislative history in some circumstances. 8'
Second, the British rule against using legislative history was partly
based on a separation of powers argument of a kind, but one having
no application to the American system. Recall that American formal-
ists partly object to the use of legislative history because the executive
cannot exercise the veto power over legislative history; hence, using
the legislative history allows the courts to redistribute power from the
executive branch to the legislative. The concern in Britain was the
opposite: "Since most legislation is promoted by the government, it is
a check on excessive executive power to insist that the law be found in
Acts as enacted, not as supplemented by ministerial statements in par-
liament during the passage of a bill."8 2
In any event, Britain has now joined the consensus in favor of
consulting legislative history.8 3 As a result, it appears that all major
democratic legal systems allow consultation of legislative history under
certain circumstances. Indeed, some go farther than we do. In Swe-
den, for example, it has been said that the statutory text serves mostly
as a kind of headline summarizing the main points of the legislative
history.84 There are, of course, disputes in the U.S. and elsewhere
about when resort to legislative history is appropriate, and how much
79 MACGORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 470, 475-76.
80 Id. at 381.
81 Id. at 381; see also F.A.R. BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 455-59 (2d ed. 1992).
82 MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 381. This argument obviously has no
application in the American context of non-parliamentary government. For a discussion of
the exceptional power the British executive enjoys under the parliamentary system, see
Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Limits of the Parliamentary Critique of the Separation of Powers, 34
WM. & MARY L. REv. 679, 723-24 (1993).
83 Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, [1992] 3 W.LR. 1032. For a discussion of
Pepper and its ramifications, see Gordon Bale, Parliamentary Debates and Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Switching on the Light or Rummaging in the Ashcans of the Legislative Process, 74 CAN. BAR
REV. 1 (1995).
84 MAcCORMICK & SUMMERS, sup-a note 1, at 325-26; see also id. at 355 (noting that
Swedish courts may rely more on legislative history than anyone else in the world).
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weight it should be given. But international experience-even in
countries whose basic jurisprudential orientation is highly formalis-
tic-seems to provide no support to the new American formalists in
their frontal attack on the legitimacy of legislative history. Like Ameri-
can formalists, their counterparts elsewhere have espoused a strict
view of the separation of powers, under which courts play no role in
creating public policy. In practice, however, this vision of the judicial
role has proved quixotic.
As we have seen, comparative research has the potential to illumi-
nate issues of statutory interpretation. In Part I, we saw that compara-
tivists have discovered intriguing similarities, as well as interesting
differences, among contemporary legal systems. Some of these, such
as the German system, appear to differ from our own in ways that may
challenge us to rethink some of our tacit assumptions. In Part II, we
have seen how a study of other legal systems can illuminate the formi-
dable new theories propounded by formalists such as Scalia and Eas-
terbrook. International experience with attempts to limit judicial
power to interpret statutes using legislative history raises serious ques-
tions about the realistic prospects for the formalist vision of statutory
interpretation.
The full implications of comparative research for theories of stat-
utory interpretation are undoubtedly yet to be explored. Unfortu-
nately, there has been little dialogue between serious scholars of
interpretation theory and well-grounded experts in comparative law
so far. But even the preliminary findings of comparativists are rich
with potential for informing our normative debates about statutory
interpretation.
The past two decades have seen the emergence of a new and vi-
brant literature by American legal scholars on statutory interpretation.
The horizons of those scholars have been limited, however, to the law
as developed by the American courts, and specifically the Supreme
Court. Interpreting Statutes presents an exciting expansion of those ho-
rizons. We can only hope that further comparative research will fol-
low in its wake.
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